Suchergebnisse

When the 2007 global financial crisis hit financial markets, European leaders were quick to point the finger at US markets, excessive risk-taking, and insufficient regulation. However, it soon became apparent that European banks were more exposed than their Wall Street counterparts. With massive dollar liabilities, European banks were dependent on the US to act as a global lender of last resort. The crisis revealed a level of transatlantic interdependence that had been unknown to most observers and policymakers prior to the crisis. We argue that this represents a paradox, given that the project of the European Monetary Union was partly motivated by a desire to make Europe more independent from the US dollar. The euro was a response to the challenge of "it's our dollar, but it's your problem." In this article, we examine how the European vulnerability to the US dollar that began post-Bretton Woods did not, in fact, disappear with the creation of a European currency. Instead, through financialization and deregulation, European financial markets developed new, complex interactions with US financial markets. This financialization of transatlantic banking flows created a new type of interdependence. As European banks were so heavily invested in US markets, this gave the US authorities a direct interest in bailing them out. While cross-border banking flows have decreased since the crisis, the interdependencies remain, and currency swaps were used once again to handle the economic fallout from Covid-19. In the area of financial and monetary policy, the transatlantic relationship remains strong and stable within a dollar hegemony.

How and why did comparative political economy (CPE) lose sight of the sources of growing macroeconomic and political instability, a problem that encompassed a growing financial bubble and then a crash in the housing market, a period of sluggish growth that plausibly constitutes secular stagnation, and a crisis of political legitimacy manifesting itself in the rise of antisystem "populist" parties? A gradual shift in CPE's research agenda from macroeconomic to microeconomic concerns, and from demand-side to supply-side explanations, diminished its ability to analyze adequately the central economic and political problems of the past twenty years. This article traces CPE's evolution through successive "supermodels" that constituted its core research foci. To understand the current crisis, CPE needs to revisit and update its original roots in Keynes, macroeconomics, and the demand side. This shift is already happening at the margins, as CPE scholars struggle to understand the current crisis.

Abstract
The power of economists in policymaking is widely recognized by both scholars and political actors. While the literature on expert influence has primarily focused on the intellectual features of expert arguments, we argue that economists' strategic use of framing and normative reasoning wields more influence in policymaking than is acknowledged by current scholarship. Through a comprehensive investigation into the institutionalization of the Norwegian Oil Fund and its associated fiscal regime, drawing on 26 elite interviews with key political and technocratic actors, we unveil the considerable influence of state economists in shaping the policy for managing petroleum wealth. These economists not only played a crucial role in legitimizing and lending credibility to the new policy but also employed strategic framing as a reinforcing mechanism to sustain the policy regime, illustrating the essential role of economists as storytellers. Hence, we suggest including strategic framing as a conceptual element within the theoretical framework of expert influence.